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16 The great economic and fiscal crisis at the beginning of this century has left a 
legacy of high public debt burden in many countries and upon many generations 
thus reducing the growth potential and in general social well-being of future gen-
erations. This is particularly important for countries such as Croatia which is, in 
addition to the old problems of the sub-optimal allocation of resources and inter-
nal structural weaknesses, facing contemporary demographic problems and the 
challenges of building a sustainable fiscal system.
As public debt by its definition represents the accumulation of past deficits, it is 
clear it is often a consequence of inappropriate past economic measures. So, in 
order to provide adequate solutions and to be able to face up to contemporary 
challenges it is necessary to obviate the causes of such a situation. 
The moment we really understand how and why we find ourselves in the current 
situation, things may begin to change. Otherwise, mistakes tend to be repeated 
with the same or similar outcomes, attended by very often suboptimal results. The 
reason is very simple: the time in which liabilities are assumed and the conse-
quences of an economic (political) decision, essential for sustainable growth, are 
often mismatched. It can take a decade before the consequences are seen. Accord-
ingly, decision-makers are prone to quick solutions, whose time horizon almost 
always extends only to the next election.
The aim of this text is to provide a brief sketch of Croatian fiscal policy in the past 
decade in order once again to highlight the inadequacy of the measures adopted. 
CROATIAN FISCAL POLICY 
Since 2004 fiscal adjustment (consolidation) has been, at least normatively, an 
important feature within Croatian economic policy. Up until the beginning of the 
crisis it was reflected in a constant lowering of the budget deficit, the decrease 
mostly, however, being due to the growth in budget revenues. Stronger inflows 
into the government budget, due to more efficient tax collection, resulted largely 
from rather strong economic growth. However, the problem was in the growth 
model, which was based on foreign capital inflows (borrowing). Therefore, the 
decrease in the deficit in the state treasury over the pre-crisis years was accompa-
nied with a historically record high vulnerability1. Thus, in the years of economic 
upswing, the budget deficit was mostly a consequence of increased public expend-
iture (salary totals, infrastructure projects, high social transfers and fees and so 
on), by new borrowing the government financed current consumption and big infra-
structural projects of questionable usefulness. Procyclical actions thus gnawed at 
the flexibility of state finances and considerably shrank the future range within 
which fiscal policy measures could act. Fundamentally, observing this over the 
course of time, during the last decade few things have changed. The cost of unpro-
1 In 2008 the current account deficit of the balance of payments reached nearly 9% of GDP, whereas through-
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17ductive expenses, such as interest, swelled, thus crippling growth potentials and 
reflecting total lack of care for future generations. Simultaneously, fiscal trans-
parency has remained rather restricted even to this day, when it is actually at a 
lower level than in the year 2008 (IBP, 2015).
Any long-term fiscal policy should include the capacity occasionally to produce a 
surplus in the entry phases of the business cycle. However, a deficit has been a 
constant in Croatian fiscal policy. Along with the fact that over the said period 
there were no structural changes in public expenditure, it is evident that in the pre-
crisis period Croatia did not run a sustainable long-term fiscal policy. It has to be 
borne in mind that, due to the absence of any political or general public consensus, 
the key reforms (such as the reform of the pension, health and/or educational sys-
tem, and of the labour market) were either delayed or only just initiated. Maintain-
ing the status quo fed the appetites of various interest groups, which reflected 
adversely on competitiveness as well as on the resilience and stability of the over-
all economy (especially in the terms of a downward cycle).The system in which 
the government directly or indirectly participates in the economy with around 
50%, and in which 70% of the state budget expenditures are social welfare expen-
ditures and expenses for employees (with low possibilities of changes in the 
already acquired rights) paired with a high tax burden, can be considered as the 
key causes of poor competitiveness, inadequate private investment, a weak labour 
market, and of the ever more significant lagging of Croatia. 
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS
This is the system that ushered us into the crisis. In a mere three years general 
government deficit soared from 3% of GDP (in 2008) to over 7% of GDP (in 
2011), and year-on-year public debt rose by over 55% thus burdening the govern-
ment budget with a 70% higher bill for debt servicing. In the course we went from 
being a state with a relatively low debt (below 40% of GDP), to a state with the 
highest public debt among CEE countries (excluding Hungary). Furthermore, the 
bulk of contingent liabilities soon became overdue and needed to be settled by the 
central government. 
At the beginning of the crisis most of the European states used government spend-
ing to mitigate the severity of the global crisis, consciously increasing their defi-
cits and public debt at the same time. Stimulating government spending in a reces-
sion environment is a classic instrument of economic policy, used to substitute for 
personal consumption, which usually plummets in economic downturns, causing 
also a fall in inventories, production, and finally a spike in unemployment. Gov-
ernment spending, stimulation of consumer optimism and a generally expansive 
fiscal as well as monetary policy are classic instruments of countercyclical action 
in developed market economies, because an aggregate increase in saving in a 
recession environment leads to the so-called paradox of thrift, i.e. a fall in produc-
tion and employment. Leaving the situation to develop along the lines of the free 
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18 ultimately intensifies the crisis. Therefore, in a recession the well-tested cure for 
economy resuscitation in the form of stimulating spending, consumer optimism 
and investments is applied. Therefore, a huge number of economic stimulation 
programs in the USA and in the euro zone are moves expected from economic 
policy agents. 
On the other hand, the economic crisis also impacted the taxation systems of the 
European Union countries strongly. In general, most governments decided to 
effect crisis mitigation through their taxation policy by decreasing the tax burden, 
primarily by lowering income tax rates and increasing tax categories. However, 
the exceptionally hard fiscal situation and the questionable viability of public 
finance in several countries them (Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, Hungary) to raise the 
tax pressure by increasing particular tax rates. 
INABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY DURING CRISIS 
At the very beginning of the crisis it was doubtful whether Croatia would fit into 
the classic Keynesian recipe oriented towards demand. Moreover, at the time of 
the crisis any countercyclical actions of fiscal policy were thwarted by past bur-
dens, or by delays in implementing reforms. Further, public expenditure expan-
sion over the pre-crisis years had not yielded the expected multiplication impact 
of increasing production due to the relatively high marginal bias of the economy 
towards imports, and thus such a policy had not resulted in increased domestic 
production, imports being financed through new borrowing.
Further, the ability to implement the policy of stimulating demand was curbed 
also by the inadequate structure of government expenditures, as the structure is 
pervaded dominantly by current expenditures consisting mostly of social welfare 
expenditures, transfers and costs of government administration and employees. 
The very rigidity and restricted quality of government budget expenditures became 
prominent during the crisis, when a strong decrease of revenues at the beginning 
of the crisis concurrent with maintenance of the same consumption level forced 
the very fiscal policy creators to undertake procyclical measures as well (such as 
implementation of the crisis tax), in order to patch up the gaping holes in the 
budget. Another restriction to countercyclical measures within the fiscal policy 
framework came from the direction of the European Commission, which put 
Croatia into the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Moreover, Croatia was 
pushed under the watchful eye of the Commission within the framework of the 
Maroeconomic Imbalances Procedures (MIP), which aims at removing any 
macroeconomic imbalances detected.
…AND AGAIN INSUFFICIENT MEASURES 
That is, throughout the period the changes that occurred in the area of public 
finances were directed dominantly at the budget revenue side, and often the taxa-
tion system was modified without proper overall analyses, which further stirred up 
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192017 year also started with a comprehensive tax reform. The aim was to create a 
stable, simple and sustainable taxation system and to alleviate the tax burden of 
entrepreneurs and households at the same time. Along with the lowered tax bur-
den, a positive impact should also come from growth in potential GDP. However, 
experience has shown that fiscal adjustment should by no means be primarily 
oriented to revenue (tax) reform, which implies a necessarily higher focus on pub-
lic expenditures. Active fiscal policy management is the more relevant when we 
know that the automatic fiscal policy stabilizers have a rather weak impact in 
Croatia. Fiscal policy should take a proactive role in lowering overall public con-
sumption, and, which is more important, in effectuating structural changes in this 
area. Naturally, throughout the process it is essential to ensure performance opti-
mization. Otherwise fiscal policy will remain a millstone around the neck of sus-
tainable economic growth and development. 
CONCLUSION
Thus the story is right at the beginning again, on the expenditure side of the budget, 
which requires changes in the normative framework of protected interest groups, 
the implementation of reforms in the pension, health and/or educational systems, 
the removal of administrative barriers and the creation of an adequate and efficient 
public administration corresponding to a country the size of Croatia. Only then 
can the sources of sustainable growth, which are currently missing, be created. 
The key to the story lies in the fact that the level of national prosperity is not 
increased through fast-achieved but through sustainable economic growth. How-
ever, reaching that point requires further structural reforms. Opportunities are out 
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